Abstract. The logic B Kc1 is the basic constructive logic for weak consistency (i.e., absence of the negation of a theorem) in the ternary relational semantics without a set of designated points. In this paper, a number of extensions of B Kc1 defined with a propositional falsity constant are defined. It is also proved that weak consistency is not equivalent to negationconsistency or absolute consistency (i.e., non-triviality) in any logic included in positive contractionless intermediate logic LC plus the constructive negation of B Kc1 and the (constructive) contraposition axioms.
Introduction
A theory is a set of formulas closed under adjunction and provable entailment (cf. §2). Then, weak consistency is defined as follows: Definition 1. Let L be a logic and a be a theory whose underlying logic is L. Then, a is w-inconsistent (weakly inconsistent) iff a contains the negation of a theorem of L (a is w-consistent iff it is not w-inconsistent).
The logic B Kc1 , the basic constructive logic adequate to this sense of consistency is defined in [8] . Next, in the same paper, it is shown how to extend B Kc1 with the strong constructive contraposition axioms and with some strong implicative axioms up to positive contractionless intuitionistic logic JW + (the logic B Kc1 plus (i) and (ii) is dubbed B Kc2 ). In [8] , it is proved that in JW + plus (i) and (ii) (consequently, in all logics included in it), weak consistency is not equivalent to negation-consistency and to absolute consistency (i.e., non-triviality) because the ECQ ('e contradictione quodlibet') axioms are not provable in JW + plus (i) and (ii). Further, in the same paper, it is proved that if the EFQ axioms (v) and (vi) are added to JW + plus (i) and (ii), the ECQ axioms (iii) and (iv) are still unprovable. Consequently, in JW + plus (i), (ii), (v), (vi), although weak consistency is equivalent to absolute consistency, it is not equivalent to negation-consistency. In respect of these results, the aim of this paper is fourfold:
1. It will be proved that the weak constructive contraposition axioms
can be added to B Kc1 , the resulting logic being different from B Kc2 . This logic is dubbed B Kc1 ′ . Further, it is proved that B Kc1 ′ can be extended with prefixing, In addition to (1) , the results on the independence of w-consistency will be strengthened in the following sense. It will be proved that:
The characteristic axiom of Dummett's LC (cf. [3]) (xii) (A → B) ∨ (B → A)
can be added to JW K+ plus (i) and (ii), weak consistency still being independent of negation-consistency and absolute consistency.
3. The axiom (xii) can be added to JW K+ plus (i), (ii), (v) and (vi), w-consistency still being independent of negation-consistency.
Last but not least, another aim of this paper is the following (a brief discussion precedes it). Let S + be a positive logic. Negation can be introduced in S + by adding to the positive language the propositional falsity constant F together with the definition
Then, two options are open: either no axioms are added to S + and a minimal negation is then defined, or some axioms are added to S + , thus defining this or that concept of negation. Now, let S F be the result of introducing a negation with a falsity constant F in S + and S ¬ be the result of adding negation with a negation connective. The question of finding definitionally equivalent logics (the concept is treated in §4) S F ′ and S ¬ ′ definitionally equivalent to S ¬ and S F , respectively, depends heavily on the strength of S + . Thus, for example, if S + is J + (i.e., positive intuitionistic logic), J + plus (i), (ii) and (v) (that is, propositional intuitionistic logic) is definitionally equivalent to J + plus the following axioms ((xiv) and (xv) would not be independent):
However, consider the logic B +,F defined in [9] . B +,F is the result of introducing a minimal negation in Routley and Meyer's system B + , which, as is known, is a weak (but most interesting) logic. The question is, which extension, if any, of B + with a negation connective is equivalent to B +,F ? But let us return to our purpose. Despite that fact that B Kc1 is not a strong logic, in [9] it is proved that the logic B Kc1,F , in which negation is introduced via a falsity constant, is definitionally equivalent to it. A fourth aim of this paper, therefore, is:
4. To define logics formulated with a falsity constant definitionally equivalent to B Kc1 ′ , B Kc2 and their extensions.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In §2, the logic B K+ along with some well known strong positive extensions of it are defined. The logic B K+ is the result of adding the K rule
to Routley and Meyer's B + . In §3, the logics B Kc1 and B Kc2 are recalled and the logic B Kc1 ′ is introduced. In §4, logics formulated with F definitionally equivalent to those defined in §3 are introduced, and in §5, the definitional equivalence is proved. In §6, all the logics treated so far are extended with some strong implicative axioms. Finally, in §7 the EFQ axioms are added. All logics are proved sound and complete in respect of a modification of Routley and Meyer's ternary relational semantics for relevance logics (note that all logics defined in this paper have the K rule (xvii)). We end this introduction by remarking that all logics here introduced are paraconsistent logics in the sense of [7] , and that they are paraconsistent in respect of a precisely defined sense of consistency, i.e., w-consistency.
The positive logic B K+ and its extensions
Firstly, the positive logic B K+ is defined. It can be axiomatized with
The rules of inference are Modus ponens (MP):
Therefore, B K+ is B + with the addition of the K rule. We now define the semantics for B K+ . A B K+ model is a triple K, R, where K is a non-empty set, and R is a ternary relation on K subject to the following definitions and postulates for all a, b, c, d ∈ K with quantifiers ranging over K:
Finally, is a valuation relation from K to the sentences of the positive language satisfying the following conditions for all propositional variables p, wff A, B and a ∈ K:
In [5] or in [8] , it is proved that B K+ is sound and complete in respect of this semantics. Remark 2. As is known, in the standard semantics for relevance logics (see, e.g., [10] ), there is a set of 'designated points' in terms of which the relation ≤ is defined and formulas are determined to be valid. The absence of this set in B K+ semantics (and the corresponding changes in d1 and the definition of validity) are the only but crucial differences between B + models and B K+ models.
Next, we define some positive extensions of B K+ . Consider the following axioms and rule of inference
The logic TW + ('Contractionless positive Ticket Entailment') is B + plus A7 and A8; the logic EW + ('Contractionless positive Logic of Entailment') is TW + plus A9; RW + ('Contractionless positive Logic of Relevance') is TW + plus A10 (see, e.g., [10] about these logics), JW + ('Contractionless positive Intuitionistic Logic') is RW + plus A11, and finally, LCW + ('Contractionless superintuitionistic logic LC') is JW + plus A12. Therefore, TW K+ , EW K+ , RW K+ , JW K+ and LCW K+ are, respectively, TW + , EW + , RW + , JW + and LCW + plus the K rule. Since the K rule is not, of course, independent in JW K+ and LCW K+ , these logics will be referred to by JW + and LCW + , respectively.
We note:
Proposition 1. 1. RW K+ and JW + are deductively equivalent logics.
2. TW K+ , EW K+ , RW K+ (= JW + ) and LCW + are different logics.
Proof. (1) is trivial and (2) follows by well known results on relevance and intuitionistic logics (alternatively, one can use MaGIC, the matrix generator developed by J. Slaney (see [11] ).
We now turn to semantics. Consider the following set of postulates
Now TW K+ models, EW K+ models RW K+ models, JW + models and LCW + models are defined, similarly, as B K+ models except for the addition of the following postulates:
1. TW K+ models: P6, P7.
2. EW K+ models: P6, P7, P8.
3. RW K+ models: P6, P7, P9.
4. JW + models: P6, P7, P9, P10.
5. LCW + models: P6, P7, P9, P11.
As in B K+ models, validity is defined in all cases in respect of all points of K.
We next define the canonical models (cf. [5] ). We begin by recalling some definitions. A theory is a set of formulas closed under adjunction and provable entailment (that is, a is a theory if whenever A, B ∈ a, then A ∧ B ∈ a; and if whenever A → B is a theorem and A ∈ a, then B ∈ a); a theory a is prime if whenever A ∨ B ∈ a, then A ∈ a or B ∈ a; a theory a is regular iff all the theorems belong to a. Finally, a is null iff no wff belong to a. Now, we define the B K+ canonical model. Let K T be the set of all theories and R T be defined on K T as follows: for all formulas A, B and a, b, c ∈ K T , R T abc iff if A → B ∈ a and A ∈ b, then B ∈ c. Further, let K C be the set of all prime non-null theories and R C be the restriction of R T to K C . Finally, let C be defined as follows: for any wff A and a
Now, let L + be any of the extensions of B K+ defined above. The L + canonical model is defined, similarly, as the B K+ canonical models except that its items are referred to L + theories instead of B K+ theories. Then, we have Proposition 2. Given the logic B K+ and B K+ semantics, P6, P7, P8, P9, P10 and P11 are the corresponding postulates to A7, A8, A9, A10, A11 and A12, respectively.
Proof. Given B K+ and B K+ semantics, we have to prove that each axiom is proved valid with the corresponding postulate and that the corresponding postulate is proved valid with the axiom. Now, that this is the case for A7 (P6), A8 (P7), A9 (P8), A10 (P9) and A11 (P10) is proved in (or can easily be derived from) e.g., [10] . So, we prove that P11 is the corresponding postulate to A12. 
A12 is LCW

P11 holds canonically:
and, for reductio,
∈ c for some wff A, B. As a is non-null, it is regular by the K rule.
Remark 3. The correspondence between postulates and axioms A7 (P6), A8 (P7), A9 (P8) and A10 (P9) stated in Proposition 2 can be proved in respect of B + instead of B K+ . Now, it is clear that, given the soundness and completeness of B K+ , those of TW K+ , EW K+ , RW K+ (= JW + ) and LCW + in respect of the corresponding semantics follow immediately by Proposition 2.
The logics B Kc1 , B Kc1' and B Kc2
We add the unary connective ¬ (negation) to the positive language. Consider the following axioms:
Then, the logics are axiomatized as follows: 
We now remark the following We now turn to semantics. Consider the following postulates
where S is a non-empty subset of K, and K, R and are defined, in a similar way, as in B K+ models, except for the addition of the following clause
and postulates P12 and P13. Then, B Kc1' models (B Kc2 models) are, simi-larly, defined as B Kc1 models, save for the addition of P14, P15 (P16, P17). In the three cases validity is defined in respect of all points of K.
The B Kc1 canonical model is the quadruple K C , S C , R C , C where K C , R C and C are defined in a similar way to which they are defined in the B K+ canonical model, and S C is interpreted as the set of all non-null prime w-consistent theories. A theory a is w-inconsistent iff for some theorem A of B Kc1 , ¬A ∈ a. A theory a is w-consistent iff it is not w-inconsistent (cf.
That is, a formula of the form ¬A is true at point a iff A is false in all consistent points accessible from a -'inconsistent' is here understood in the (minimal) intuitionistic way-. So, in ternary relational semantics, the (minimal) intuitionistic clause would be translated as clause (v). That is, a formula of the form ¬A is true in point a iff A is false in all points b such that Rabc for all consistent points c -consistent' is here understood as w-consistent-. Now, in [8] it is proved that B Kc1 and B Kc2 are sound and complete in respect of the corresponding semantics just defined. So, we proceed to prove the soundness and the completeness of B Kc1' . We first prove a useful proposition stating that w-consistency of theories is preserved when they are extended to prime theories (this proposition is implicitly used in what follows). Let B +,¬ be any extension of B + in which the rule contraposition con. ⊢ A → B ⇒ ⊢ ¬B → ¬A is provable. We note that the following De Morgan law
is provable in B +,¬ (A2, A5, con.). Note also that con. is provable in B Kc1 : it is T1 B Kc1 .
We have 
Consequently, x is w-inconsistent, which is impossible, so x is prime.
Thus, in any logic including B + plus con., w-consistent theories can be extended to prime w-consistent theories.
Next, we prove Proposition 5. Given the logic B Kc1 and B Kc1 semantics,
P14 is the corresponding postulate to A15, and
2. P15 is the corresponding postulate to A16.
Proof. We prove case 1. The proof of case 2 is similar and is left to the reader. ]} such that R T acx and R T bxy. We prove that y is w-consistent. Suppose it is not. Then, ¬A ∈ y, A being a theorem. So, B → ¬A ∈ b, C → B ∈ a for some wff B and C ∈ c. As A is a theorem, ⊢ B Kc1 (B → ¬A) → ¬B by T4 B Kc1 . So, ¬B ∈ b. Now, ¬B → ¬C ∈ a by A15. Therefore, ¬C ∈ z (R T abz, ¬B ∈ b) whence by A13, C → ¬(C → C) ∈ z and, consequently, ¬(C → C) ∈ d (R T zcd, C ∈ c), contradicting the w-consistency of d. Now, given the soundness and completeness of B Kc1 , by Proposition 5, it follows: Theorem 1 (soundness and completeness of B Kc1 ′ ). ⊢ B Kc1' A iff B Kc1' A.
A15 is B
The logic B Kc1F and its extensions
We add the propositional falsity constant F to the positive language together with the definition D¬: ¬A ↔ A → F Now, consider the following axioms:
Then, the following logics are defined: 
and that postulate P13 is substituted by P18. B Kc1F ′ models (B Kc2F models) are defined similarly as B Kc1F models save for the addition of P14 and P15 (P16, P17). In the three cases validity is defined in respect of all points of K. Now, we introduce the following definition:
Definition 2. Let L F be a logic whose language has the propositional falsity constant F . Further, let a be a L F theory. Then, a is inconsistent iff F ∈ a; a is consistent iff a is not inconsistent.
The B Kc1F canonical model is the quadruple K C , S C , R C , C , where K C , R C and C are defined in a similar way to which they are defined in the B Kc1 (or B K+ ) canonical model, and S C is the set of all non-null prime consistent theories, 'consistent' being understood as in definition 2. The B Kc1F ′ canonical model and the B Kc2F canonical model are defined similarly, but with its items referred to B Kc1F ′ theories and B Kc2F theories, respectively. Now, in [9] it is proved that B Kc1F is sound and complete in respect of the semantics just defined. So, we shall prove the soundness and completeness of B Kc1F ′ and B Kc2F . As in the case of B Kc1 , a proposition on the preservation of consistency in building prime theories is provable. Let B +,F be the result of extending the positive language of B + with the propositional falsity constant F , no new axioms, however, being added. We have:
Proposition 6. Let a be a consistent B +,F theory. Then, there is some prime consistent theory x such that a ⊆ x. Proposition 4) , which is impossible. Therefore, x is prime.
Thus, in any logic including B +,F , consistent theories can be extended to prime consistent theories.
We now prove Proposition 7. Given the logic B Kc1F and B Kc1F semantics, P14, P15, P16 and P17 are the corresponding postulates to A21, A22, A23 and A24, respectively.
Proof. We prove, e.g., that P16 is the corresponding postulate to A23. The rest of the cases are proved similarly and are left to the reader. 
Now, given the soundness and completeness of B Kc1F , by Proposition 7, it follows:
Theorem 2 (soundness and completeness of B Kc1F ′ and B Kc2F ).
We end this section with the following proposition: Proposition 8. Let a be a B Kc1F theory. Then, a is inconsistent iff a is w-inconsistent.
Proof. (1) Suppose F ∈ a and let A be a theorem. By A19, A → F ∈ a. (2) Let A be a theorem and A → F ∈ a. Then, F ∈ a by A20.
Therefore, in B Kc1F (and in all logics included in it) inconsistency (as the presence of F ) and w-inconsistency are coextensive.
5. The definitional equivalence between B Kc1 and B Kc1F and their respective extensions That is, F replaces any wff of the form ¬(A → A) (note that the defining formula does not depend on the choice of A). We remark:
Proposition 9. Let a be a B Kc1 theory. Then, a is w-inconsistent iff for some wff A, ¬(A → A) ∈ a.
Proof. By T2 B Kc1 . Therefore, in B Kc1 (and in all logics including it) a theory is winconsistent iff it contains F . In fact, this proposition is a corollary of the following:
Proposition 10. Let a be a B Kc1 theory. Then, a is w-inconsistent iff a contains the negation of any theorem.
Proof. By T2 B Kc1 .
And this proposition is, in turn, a corollary of this one:
Proposition 11. Let a be a B Kc1 theory. Then, a is w-inconsistent iff a contains every negative formula.
Therefore, in B Kc1 (and in all logics which include it) w-inconsistency is equivalent to the presence of every negative formula, the presence of the negation of any theorem or, finally, the presence of F (as defined above). Next, we turn to the proof of the definitional equivalence. We shall understand the notion as 'definitional equivalence via translations' (see, e.g., [6] ). We have to prove the following two propositions (Proposition 12 is not sufficient: cf. [2] ):
DF is provable in B Kc1F ∪ {D¬} Propositions 12 and 13 are proved in [9] . So, in order to prove the definitional equivalence between B Kc1 ′ and B Kc1F ′ , B Kc2 and B Kc2F , it suffices to prove propositions 14 and 15 that follow:
Proof. 1. A21 = A15, A22 = A16, by D¬.
2. T1 B Kc1 ′ = A21, T2 B Kc1 ′ = A22, by DF .
Proof. 1. A23 = A17, A24 = A18, by D¬.
2. T1 B Kc2 = A23, T2 B Kc2 = A24, by DF .
Strengthening the positive logics
We take up again the extensions of B K+ defined in §2. Now, negation can be introduced in these logics in a similar way to which it was introduced in B K+ . Thus, the following logics can be defined:
It is clear that, given propositions 14 and 15, the logics definitionally equivalent to those in groups 1-3, can be defined:
We prove:
Proposition 16. TW Kc1 and TW Kc1 ′ are deductively equivalent logics. So, EW Kc1 and EW Kc1 ′ , RW Kc1 (= JW c1 ) and RW Kc1 ′ (= JW c1 ′ ) and LCW c1 and LCW c1 ′ are deductively equivalent logics.
Proof. A15 is derivable by A8, A13 and A14; A16 is derivable by A7, A13 and A14.
Proposition 17. RW Kc1 (= JW c1 ) and RW Kc2 (= JW c2 ) and LCW c1 and LCW c2 are deductively equivalent logics.
Proof. Firstly, we note that A15 and A16 are derivable. Next, by A11 and A15,
By 1 and A14
A → ¬¬A
Then, A17 and A18 are easily provable with, respectively, A15 and A16 together with introduction of double negation (2). Now, as EW Kc1 and TW Kc2 (so, TW Kc1 and TW Kc2 , EW Kc1 and EW Kc2 ) and EW Kc2 and RW Kc1 are different logics (MaGIC), the relations between these logics can be summarized in the following diagram where the arrow (→) stands for set inclusion.
A similar diagram is, of course, obtained for the definitionally equivalent logics defined with the propositional falsity constant.
Remark 5. Recall that LCW c1 , RW Kc1 , EW Kc2 and TW Kc2 are the result of adding the strong constructive contraposition axioms A17 and A18 to LCW + , RW K+ (= JW + ), EW K+ and TW K+ , and that EW Kc1 and TW Kc1 are, respectively, EW K+ and TW Kc+ plus the weak constructive contraposition axioms A15 and A16.
Remark 6. EW Kc2 , EW Kc1 , TW Kc2 and TW Kc1 are constructive modal logics (the arrow in these logics is some kind of strict implication). But we note that these logics are not included in, e.g., Lewis' modal S5 as axiomatized by Hacking [4] (and, of course, neither do they include it): A13, for example, is not a theorem of S5. On the other hand, we remark that a necessity operator can be introduced (as in [1] , §4.3) in EW Kc2 and EW Kc1 via the definition A = df (A → A) → A. Generally speaking, the operator thus introduced has the characteristic properties of the necessity operator of Lewis' S4 but with interesting relations with a possibility operator ♦ definable from it, due to the absence of elimination of double negation and its accompanying theses. The analysis of this question cannot, however, be pursued here.
Regarding soundness and completeness of the logics introduced in this section, it is obvious that they follow immediately from those of the positive logics and B Kc1 (B Kc1F ), B Kc1 ′ (B Kc1F ′ ) and B Kc2 (B Kc2F ).
We end this section with the following propositions Proposition 18. Let a be a theory of B Kc1 . Then, if a is w-inconsistent, a contains a contradiction.
Proof. Suppose ¬A ∈ a, A being a theorem. By the K rule, ⊢ B Kc1 ¬A → A. So, A ∈ a and, consequently, A ∧ ¬A ∈ a.
However, the converse of this proposition does not hold because it is proved:
Proposition 19. The ECQ axioms (iii) (A∧¬A) → B, (iv) (A∧¬A) → ¬B and the EFQ axioms (v) ¬A → (A → B), (vi) A → (¬A → B) (cf. §1) are not provable in LCW c1 .
Proof. By MaGIC.
Therefore, in LCW c1 (and all logics included in it), w-consistency is not equivalent to negation-consistency or absolute consistency.
Finally, we note:
Proposition 20. The reductio and contraction axioms cannot be added to B Kc1 if we do not want w-consistency to collapse in negation consistency.
Proof. 1. Suppose that the principle of non-contradiction is provable, and so, the ECQ axiom (iii) follows by T3 B Kc1 .
Not even (xxi) [A ∧ (A → B)] → B
can be added, because (iii) is again provable by T3 B Kc1 . Now, if (iii) is provable, w-consistency collapses in negation-consistency, by Proposition 18.
Introducing the EFQ axioms
In [8] , the EFQ axioms are added to JW Kc1 and it is proved that, though w-consistency is then equivalent to absolute consistency, it is not equivalent to negation-consistency. We shall prove that this result still holds if the EFQ axioms are added to LCW c1 .
Consider the EFQ axioms 
The logics are:
1. LCW c1 + A25 (= LCW c1 + A26).
2. LCW c1F + A27 (= LCW c1F + A28).
We note the following theorem of LCW c1 + A25:
Remark 7. Semantics for LCW c1 + A25 (or LCW c1F + A27) are considerably different from those of the logics treated so far. The reader is referred to [8] for details.
Proposition 21. LCW c1 +A25 and LCW c1F +A27 are definitionally equivalent logics.
Proof. Given propositions 14, 15, it follows immediately by t1 LCW c1 +A25 with DF and by A27 with D¬. Now, we have, of course, by A26:
Proposition 22. Let a be a LCW c1 +A25 theory. Then, a is w-inconsistent iff a contains every wff.
However, we note (MaGIC):
Proposition 23. The ECQ axioms (iii) and (iv) (cf. §1) are not provable in LCW c1 + A25.
Therefore, in LCW c1 + A25 (and all logics included in it), w-consistency is not equivalent to negation-consistency. So, all logics defined in this paper are paraconsistent logics in the sense of [7] . And, we note, they are paraconsistent in respect of a precisely defined concept of consistency, i.e., w-consistency.
